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5Abstract
Considering the value of archives for dealing with the 
past processes, especially for the establishment of 
collective memory and identity, this paper discusses 
the role of archives in situations of conflicting memories 
such as in the case of the official Turkish denial of  
the Armenian genocide. A crucial problem of Turkish- 
Armenian reconciliation are the divergent perceptions 
of what to consider as proper ‘evidence’, i.e. as  
objective, reliable, impartial or trustworthy sources  
of knowledge in order to prove the Armenian geno-
cide. The aim of this paper is to show how in a general 
atmosphere of distrust or prejudiced credibility judg-
ments, even technically reliable archival records will 
be perceived as unreliable and biased, lacking any 
evidentiary status to factually prove a genocide which 
is categorically denied. Therefore, this working paper 
discusses how claims to reliability, objectivity and 
other similar scientifically and epistemically relevant 
attributes are understood in archival science as well 
as memory studies, and emphasizes the problems 
related to their instrumentalization by political actors 
within the context of genocide denialism. The Turkish-
Armenian context promises many important empirical 
as well as theoretical insights on the uses and mis-
uses of these attributes, suggesting that measures 
ought to be taken beforehand to decrease intergroup 
prejudice and distrust toward the ‘other’, so that ar-
chives can be effective in the truth-finding process. 
61 The author wishes to thank Julie Bernath 
and Elisabeth Baumgartner for their 
valuable comments as well as their 
editing work.
The paradigms of transitional justice and dealing with the past have put the 
role of archives into a new light. Not only are archives documenting massive 
human rights violations important for processing accountability, but also for 
the establishment of a collective memory insofar as they provide important 
sources upon which knowledge can be obtained, experiences remembered and 
rendered intelligible, ultimately to promote social justice (Harris, 2002; 
Schwartz and Cook, 2002; Jimerson, 2007; Jimerson, 2009). Memory work may 
also help in the process of conflict transformation: a shared memory of past 
experiences of mass violence is a crucial step towards long-term reconciliation 
between divided communities in the aftermath of genocide (Campbell, 2014; 
López, 2015). In turn, a conflict in memory is likely to foster new conflict and 
generally block dealing with the past. For when there is no common under-
standing of the past, there is no agreement on what it is that should be dealt 
with and how. 
Considering the value of archives for the establishment of meaningful 
knowledge and memory, this paper discusses the role of archives in situations 
of conflicting memories such as in Turkish-Armenian relations and how this 
conflict inherently carries with it divergent perceptions of the reliability of 
knowledge claimants and the way in which knowledge can contribute to dealing 
with the past. A central problem within this process is that it involves con- 
flicting perceptions of what can be considered as ‘proper evidence’, leading to 
diverging understandings of what counts as objective, reliable, impartial and 
trustworthy knowledge, respectively ‘proof’ for considering the Ottoman 
atrocities towards Armenians as constituting genocide. By identifying archives 
as well as collective memory as realms of social practices, it will be argued 
that in a general atmosphere of distrust and prejudice, even appropriate 
archival records may be perceived as unreliable, lacking evidentiary status to 
factually ground a genocide that is categorically denied. Therefore, this paper 
should especially clarify the way in which claims to reliability, objectivity and 
other similar scientifically and epistemically relevant attributes are used in the 
context investigated in this paper and emphasize the problems related 
especially to their misuse by political rhetoric.
The Turkish-Armenian context of genocide denialism promises many 
important empirical as well as theoretical insights on the uses and misuses of 
these attributes, since the debate around the Armenian genocide is crucially 
marked by claims and counterclaims of partiality, which are implicitly related 
to claims about the reliability of the knowledge and evidence at hand. This 
asks for a thorough examination of these notions and how they relate to both 
spheres, archival practices as well as collective memory. It will be argued that 
the fact that archives may not be considered as ‘neutral agents’ in the first 
place asks for prior specific measures that aim at reducing prejudice and 
distrust towards the ‘other’, at least if we want academic scholarship to have 
an effect on conflict transformation.1
1
Introduction
72 UN Commission on Human Rights Final 
Report on the set of principles against 
impunity prepared by Louis Joinet,  




of_HR_Violations.pdf; UN Document E/
CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, Report of Diane 
Orentlicher, independent expert to update 
the Set of principles to combat impunity 
– Updated Set of principles for the 
protection and promotion of human rights 
through action to combat impunity.
3 Art. 226 states that “[t]he Turkish 
Government recognises the right of the 
Allied Powers to bring before military 
tribunals persons accused of having 
committed acts in violation of the laws 
and customs of war. Such persons shall, 
if found guilty, be sentenced to punish-
ments laid down by law […],” and Art. 230 
states that “[t]he Turkish Government 
undertakes to hand over to the Allied 
Powers the persons whose surrender may 
be required by the latter as being 
responsible for the massacres committed 
during the continuance of the state of war 
on territory which formed part of the 
Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914. […]”
Based on the four pillars of the conceptual framework of dealing with the past 
that is grounded on the principles against impunity written by United Nations 
(UN) Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet and later up-dated recommendations by 
Diane Orentlicher2 (see Sisson, 2010: 15), this chapter will outline how these 
pillars have been addressed in the aftermath of the massacres, deportations 
and forced assimilations of Armenians within the Ottoman Empire. The examples 
mentioned for each pillar are selected in order to illustrate how archival 
records may or may not be of use to the particular example.
2.1 The Right to Justice and the Guarantee 
of Non-Recurrence
The right to justice and the guarantee of non-recurrence refer to the right of 
victims to have the perpetrators tried and legally prosecuted, and the need for 
institutional change in order for a state to deal with, condemn and distance 
itself from its violent institutional legacy, thereby preventing recurrence of the 
crime. What happened, then, to the main perpetrators after the genocide, 
which was followed by the end of the First World War, the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey? 
There were indeed efforts to prosecute Ottoman war criminals and those 
responsible for “excesses against Armenians”, particularly members of the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, sometimes also referred to as “Young 
Turks”). The call for prosecutions was taken up by the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919 that led to the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, a peace agreement between 
the Triple Entente (Russia, France and Britain) and the Ottoman Empire. The 
agreement was signed under authorization of the last Ottoman Sultan Mehmed 
VI. and the Ottoman government under Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha. It  
was especially due to pressure by the former Allied Powers that as early as  
14 December 1918, a military tribunal was established by a special decree of 
the Sultan (Akçam, 2011: 254). The establishment of military tribunals related 
to the investigation of Armenian massacres and deportations is mentioned 
particularly in Articles 226 and 230 of the treaty.3 
Akçam (2011: 251–270) investigates the establishment and progress of 
such a tribunal, based on various important Ottoman daily newspapers of that 
time, among them Vakit, Sabah, Ikdam, Tercuman-ı Hakikat, Yeni Gazete, 
Takvim-i Vekayi, which covered the whole process and published the verdicts, 
as well as other archival material such as minutes of the Chamber of Notables, 
transcripts of the Grand National Assembly and sources from the General 
Directorate of State Archives of the Prime Ministry in Turkey, all located in 
Ankara. Akçam claims that a thorough and consequent prosecution of those 
responsible for the atrocities has particularly failed due to the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic under Mustafa 
Kemal (“Atatürk”) in 1923. While in the year 1920 a few successful trials  
and sentences took place, the military tribunal came to an end rather quickly 
especially since it also sentenced members of the National Independence 
Army (Kuvay-I Milli). These were indeed increasingly gaining support from the 
2
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population and were obviously against the decisions of the Sultan, especially 
with regard to his cooperation with the Allied powers. The military tribunal  
thus not only sentenced some of those responsible for crimes against Armenians 
and other non-Muslims. Further death sentences were handed down to Mustafa 
Kemal himself, as well as hundred defendants of the nationalist movement  
and sixteen of those attempting to assassinate the Grand Vizier (Ibid: 261).  
This obviously heightened the tensions between the nationalist movement 
in Eastern Turkey and the Istanbul Sultanate. The demands for a re-organi-
zation of the tribunals rose high, leading to the resignation of Grand Vizier 
Damad Ferit Pasha’s cabinet on 17 October 1920 and his replacement. In order 
to establish peaceful relations with the nationalist movement in Ankara, 
efforts were made “to invalidate the prosecutions that had taken place during 
the Damad Ferit Pasha regime” (Ibid: 262). With the final takeover of Istanbul 
by the Ankara national government on 6 November 1922, the tribunals even 
ended entirely (Ibid: 265). The decisions of the tribunals were considered null 
and void by the Ankara National Assembly even before, but it was finally 
decided on 31 March 1923 that “all those imprisoned by decision from both 
civil and military courts were granted a general amnesty” (Ibid.). With the rise of 
the nationalist movement – or the “national liberation movement” – under 
Mustafa Kemal, the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres were perceived as a plan 
by the Allies to divide the Turkish Empire and obviously considered a threat  
to their nationalist objectives, since it indeed also entailed the drawing of new 
borders and autonomous regions for Kurds as well as Armenians. As a result, 
whoever supported the treaty was considered as a national traitor. The treaty 
would have covered many important provisions for victims of the massacres 
and deportations, including the responsibility of the Turkish government to 
undertake necessary steps to ensure their re-integration into society, acknowl-
edgment of their equal civil, cultural and political rights.
Therefore, the treaty was supposed to provide a solution to the problem 
of institutional discrimination by granting Armenians and other non-Turks (or 
non-Muslims)4 full civil and political rights, autonomy and independence in 
their cultural and religious expression. Article 145 of the treaty even foresaw 
that “within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present 
Treaty the Turkish Government will submit to the Allied Powers a scheme for 
the organization of an electoral system based on the principle of proportional 
representation of racial minorities.” It can thus be considered as one of the 
first manifestations of the growing role of international protection of human 
rights, and more particularly a recognition of the special protection of national 
minorities (see Schabas, 2000: 16). However, because of the overthrow of the 
Sultanate in Istanbul, the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified. With the “war  
of liberation”, Mustafa Kemal intended the ultimate liberation from the control  
of the Allied powers as well as the Sultanate, and the foundation of an 
independent Turkish Republic. This also meant the defeat of any territorial 
demands on behalf of Kurds or Armenians, as it was foreseen in the Treaty of 
Sèvres: For example, Art. 62–64 demanded the drafting of a scheme of “local 
autonomy” for predominantly Kurdish areas and the possibility for Kurds to 
demand independence within one year from coming into force of the Treaty. 
4 The genocide committed under the Young 
Turk regime constitutes a hybrid form: 
The modus operandi was in the tradition 
of a Muslim Jihad in which conquest, 
subjugation and forced conversions of 
so-called infidels was met with plunder 
and confiscation. This included as victims 
especially Armenians, Assyrians and 
Pontic Greeks. Most researchers, however, 
suggest that the genocide was primarily 
nationalistically motivated, aimed at the 
establishment of a unified nation state. 
See Hofmann, forthcoming 2017.  
This also explains why Alevi and Kurdish 
people were subsequently targeted as 
threats to national unity and subjected to 
ethnic discrimination and massacres  
due to their claim for autonomous rule – a 
conflict that persists to this day.
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Art. 88–93 demanded from Turkey to recognize Armenia as an independent 
state, suggesting a frontier which granted Armenians more territory than was 
later determined by the Lausanne Treaty. 
In 1922, after the Turkish victory in the Greco-Turkish war in Smyrna 
– where tens of thousands Greeks and Armenians were massacred – the 
Ankara government was recognized by the Allied Powers, and the Treaty of 
Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, which created and recognized 
the sovereignty of the Turkish state within the borders that remained mostly 
the same until today.5 While the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 also recognizes 
in its Articles 37–45 the protection and rights of minorities6, other elements  
of the Treaty of Sèvres, such as military tribunals to adjudicate war crimes, and 
thus the recognition of massacres and deportations were no longer an issue. 
As can be seen from the preamble of the treaty, its main aim was now to 
“re-establish the relations of friendship and commerce,” based on the consid-
eration “that these relations must be based on respect for the indepen dence 
and sovereignty of States.” In terms of transitional justice, this was the death- 
knell.
All in all, the Ottoman courts-martial, active over nearly three years 
(1919–1922), proved to be unsatisfying at least with regard to punitive justice. 
Impunity became a reward for those perpetrators “who embraced the emerging 
nationalist movement and joined its ranks” (Akçam and Dadrian, 2011: 1). 
While some perpetrators were prosecuted and sentenced to death, the fact that 
these sentences were in retrospect considered null and void by the newly 
established government sent a strong signal to the remaining members of the 
Committee of Union and Progress7 as well as nationalists supporting the new 
government. However, what the tribunals indeed achieved was to “assemble 
and classify a mass of documentary evidence affording the establishment  
of the facts of a centrally organized mass murder enacted against the Ottoman 
Empire’s Armenian population” (Ibid: 2). These documents prove to be invalu-
 able to historical scholarship especially because of the procedure of document 
verification that was part of the legal-criminal process:
“First, [..] every one of them was examined and authenticated by com - 
petent officials, most of them holdover partisans of the defamed  
CUP regime attached to the Ministries of Justice and Interior; they then 
would affix on top or at the bottom of each document the formula  
‘It conforms to the original’. Second, in nearly all cases the defendants 
were asked to examine the documents bearing their signatures and 
verify their authenticity.” (Dadrian, 2011: 16)
Despite these initial efforts to condemn and prosecute the CUP leaders, 
Ankara declared a general pardon for those who had been convicted by the 
courts-martial as well as by municipal criminal courts and ended all further 
efforts to bring about justice and reconciliation. In subsequent years, Kemalists 
even celebrated and memorialized them as “national martyrs” (Dadrian, 2011: 
105). Considering the aforementioned political tensions within the shattered 
5 Kemalist nationalists continued to 
massacre Christians in the course of their 
“liberation war”. For an overview of the 
victims during that time, see Rummel 
(1997) Statistics of Turkish Democide: 
Estimates, Sources, Calculations, Table 
5.1A, Lines 316–358. Available at http://
www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.
TAB5.1A.GIF (last accessed 28 April 2016).
6 Ekmekçiogˇlu (2014) argues, however, that 
these minority protection clauses para - 
doxically entrenched the divisions that 
had already been formed in the Ottoman 
Empire during the preceding violent 
decades.
7 Some of the main perpetrators escaped 
to Germany, e.g. the Ottoman interior 
minister Talât Pasha, later assassinated 
in Berlin by Soghomon Tehlirian. Germa-
ny’s refusal to deliver those who were 
sentenced for their crimes by the Ottoman 
military tribunals and ceasing interna-
tional interest to deal with the Ottoman 
crimes led to a series of vigilante exe- 
cu tions of former perpetrators (and later 
also Turkish diplomats), planned and 
carried out by a group of Armenian 
militants.
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Ottoman Empire, standing between the control of the Allies and its own natio n - 
alist movement, the issue of the massacres and deportations was quickly 
buried after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and the signing of the 
Treaty of Lausanne. In fact, just as the National Assembly in Ankara was 
informed about the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, it declared those signing 
the treaty as traitors, a crime that was subject to death penalty under Turkish 
law at that time. Thus, demands for adequate reparations or any acknowl-
edgement of the atrocities committed were anything but recognized in the 
official narrative of the foundation of Turkey. 
According to our present-day understanding of how to properly deal with 
past crimes against humanity and genocide, the punishment of some of the 
main perpetrators is certainly not enough to do justice and to promote recon-
ciliation between the groups within society anyway. The principles against 
impunity developed by Joinet recognize in relation to the right to know a state 
obligation to preserve memory, which is intergenerationally transmitted and 
becomes part of the cultural heritage of the affected group. However, the 
creation of a new Turkish identity came with an official national history where 
the atrocities against Armenians and other Christian minorities are considered 
as necessary means to defend the empire from ‘internal enemies’ in the course  
of a ‘liberation war’. This portrayal of Armenians as ‘national traitors’ mobilized 
and supported by Russia – thus legitimizing their annihilation and eviction 
from their homeland, while at the same time denying a genocidal intent behind 
the atrocities – has consequences until this day. Even a century later and in 
the context of the renewed aggressions towards Kurds, the issue of the Kurdish 
struggle for autonomy is brought into relation with Armenians.8 Even though 
there is a relation in the sense that members of both groups have demanded 
their right to self-determination and organized political movements, in the 
heads of generations after the genocide, Armenians are still the projection 
surface of everything that threatens the alleged unity of the Turkish nation.9 
2.2 The Right to Reparations and the Right to Know
The Treaty of Sèvres had foreseen reparations for “Turkish subjects of non- 
Turkish race” and called for the Turkish government to assist in the search for 
and deliverance of disappeared persons. For example, Article 142 of the  
treaty stressed that the enforced conversions to Islam were invalid, providing 
them the right to keep and live out their own religion. It further states:
“[…] In order to repair so far as possible the wrongs inflicted on individuals 
in the course of the massacres perpetrated in Turkey during the war,  
the Turkish Government undertakes to afford all the assistance in its 
power or in that of the Turkish authorities in the search for and deliv-
erance of all persons, of whatever race or religion, who have disappeared, 
been carried off, interned or placed in captivity since November 1, 1914. 
[…]”
8 See article in Al-Monitor: http://www.
al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/
turkey-armenian-kurds-minorities-
forced-to-be-turkish.html#; in The 
Armenian Weekly: http://armenianweekly.
com/2016/01/07/the-implications-of-
turkeys-war/; as well as a posting from  
22 December 2015 by Human Rights 
Watch mentioning Turkish police shouting 
“Armenian bastards” during the curfew  
in Cizre: https://www.hrw.org/
news/2015/12/22/turkey-mounting-
security-operation-deaths (last accessed 
8 February 2016).
9 Only recently, a Turkish-Armenian 
journalist was fined because he called 
the mayor of Ankara an “Armenian”.  




wsCatID=339 (last accessed 8 February 
2016).
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With regard to returning the illegally seized properties of the deported,  
Article 144 states:
“The Turkish Government recognises the injustice of the law of 1915 
relating to Abandoned Properties (Emval-i-Metroukeh), and of the 
supplementary provisions thereof, and declares them to be null and 
void, in the past as in the future.
The Turkish Government solemnly undertakes to facilitate to the greatest 
possible extent the return to their homes and re-establishment in their 
businesses of the Turkish subjects of non-Turkish race who have been 
forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or any other form of 
pressure since January 1, 1914. It recognises that any immovable or 
movable property of the said Turkish subjects or of the communities to 
which they belong, which can be recovered, must be restored to them  
as soon as possible, in whatever hands it may be found. […]”
The question of what should happen to the confiscated Armenian 
property is still a central one. In 2012, a research project of the Hrant Dink 
Foundation in Istanbul published a monumental work on the history and 
present status of the properties that once belonged to the Armenian charitable 
foundations in Istanbul – properties that were seized by the Turkish govern-
 ment during the last decades. The research is based mainly on the archives of 
Hrant Dink, Agos newspaper, Advocate Diran Bakar and Armenian foundations. 
The project, which was published as a book entitled “The 2012 Declaration: 
The Seized Properties of Armenian Foundations in Istanbul”, includes digital 
copies of documents from these archives.10 Nevertheless, despite many recent 
efforts to identify Armenian property and demands for reparations on behalf  
of descendants, Armenian organizations and political or religious institutions, 
actual reparations have remained practically inexistent – especially when 
addressed at Turkey.11 However, the number of lawsuits against Turkey  
has increased, especially with regard to the return of confiscated properties. 
The most recent case that gained international attention was the Armenian 
Church’s lawsuit to demand the return of the Armenian spiritual center in Sis.12 
When it comes to such reparation efforts, archival records take on a 
crucial role. However, the issue of reparations in contexts of transitional 
justice involves not only the returning of, or compensation for, confiscated or 
seized properties to particular individuals and institutions. There are other 
losses that need to be addressed and repaired, which can be labelled ‘symbolic’ 
or ‘societal forms’ of reparations. Among those, we may consider memorials, 
monuments or museums that have been established in order to provide loci of 
remembrance and education in the public domain, but also official apologies. 
The Armenian National Institute has currently identified 200 memorials and 
monuments in 32 countries dedicated to the memory of the Armenian genocide.13 
Certainly, attempts to erect monuments or memorials in relation to the 
Armenian genocide have not always remained uncriticized by Turkey.14 One 
recent example from Switzerland is the Turkish objection against the attempt 
10 See homepage of the project at  
http://istanbulermenivakiflari.org/.
11 Some lawsuits against financial institu-
tions have been successful, such as for 
example a lawsuit against the New York 
Life Insurance Company in 2004 or the 




(last accessed 20 December 2016)
13 Database available under http://www.
armenian-genocide.org/memorials.html
14 For a very insightful discussion of the 
political discourses around memory and 
monuments in Turkey, illustrated with the 
example of Aksoy’s “Monument of 
Humanity”, see Erbal, 2016.
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to erect a memorial in Geneva.15 After initial plans to erect the memorial in the 
old town of Geneva in 2011 were silenced by a Turkish intervention to the 
Geneva government and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, a 
new location was discussed for the memorial, namely the Ariana Parc, where 
the Palais de Nations is located. This fostered even more criticism by the 
Turkish authorities. According to Celâl Bayar, president of the association of 
Turkish unions in the Romandie, the new location was “a provocation”. He 
claimed that it violates UN principles, and that there was no genocide against 
Armenians in the sense of the definition of the 1948 UN Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.16 In addition, he considered 
the memorial as Turcophobic, contending that such a controversial topic  
had to be dealt with in an open academic debate and not by a one-sided view 
by one party.17 This mirrors the decades old official stance of Turkey towards  
the Armenian genocide, which has ever since turned a blind eye on the already 
existing open, international and serious academic work that has been con - 
duc ted by historians and other scholars, as well as the academic consensus  
established among genocide scholars with regard to the Armenian genocide.18 
However, in the case of the Geneva memorial, the Geneva city council eventually 
gave in to the Turkish demands and the project has not been realized since. 
This recent case of a failed attempt of symbolic reparation through 
memorialization shows the continuing delicate situation and meandering 
between steps towards truth and reconciliation through memorialization, and 
denial, where any relation to the Armenian genocide is considered as treason 
and provocation, feeding the idea that it is still a debatable question. This brings 
us to the next pillar of dealing with the past, namely the right to know, which 
involves the idea that crimes ought to be known and recognized. This is a first 
crucial step to implement further mechanisms of transitional justice. To truly 
recognize the genocide is to recognize the fact that the victim group and their 
descendants have a right to keep the injustice in their cultural memory, as a 
source upon which they can make sense of their own history and identity which 
is bound up with their belonging to the group. These considerations are also 
mirrored by the Joinet principles to combat impunity, which declare that besides 
the victim’s right to know, society as a whole has both a right to truth and a 
duty to preserve memory.19 The right to know is thus also a collective right, for
“[a] people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its 
heritage and, as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in 
fulfilment of the State’s duty to preserve archives and other evidence 
concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to 
facilitate knowledge of those violations. Such measures shall be aimed 
at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular,  
at guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist 
arguments.” 20
Before taking a closer look at the role of archives within this process,  
a conceptual clarification with regard to the term ‘collective memory’ is called 
for. 
15 See newspaper article of the Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) from 17 June 2016: 
http://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/aktuelle-
themen/armenien-denkmal-ld.89652  
(last accessed 20 December 2016).
16 See NZZ article from 8 May 2013: http://
www.nzz.ch/schweiz/tuerkei-will-
gedenkstaette-in-genf-verhin-
dern-1.18077908. Own translation. The 
quotations can be derived from a 
statement by Bayar himself in his article 
from 3 March 2015 in Le Temps: https://
www.letemps.ch/opinions/2015/03/03/
memorial-armenien-geneve-attitude-
responsable-didier-burkhalter (both last 
accessed 08 February 2016).
17 Ibid.
18 Sometimes, it is claimed that the consen-
sus is on behalf of “Western academics”. 
However, this is itself a narrow view that 
feeds a prejudiced narrative, since there 
have also been many Turkish intellectuals 
speaking out for genocide recognition. 
19 Supra fn 2
20 Ibid., page 7 
13
21 Assmann (2009: 136f.) argues that 
storage memory as ‘neutral’ knowledge 
does not create meaning by itself or 
grounds any values, but it can build the 
either stabilizing or corrective back-
ground for such operations.
Memory – whether it is individual or collective memory – is dynamic because it 
involves both actual experiences and events as well as considerations about 
what meaning and significance they should have for our present and future lives. 
It is especially the selective nature of what to remember and the determination 
of its significance that allows the process of memory construction to be adaptive 
and open to change. However, acknowledging memory as subjectively (or 
socially) reconstructive does not mean that it is per definition unreliable and 
that the notion of truth is inapplicable. The next sections outline the general 
idea of collective memory as a social construct, and introduce accuracy and 
integrity as virtues of remembering by which we can approach the idea of 
“successful” memory, in the sense of memory being a truthful understanding 
of the past, thereby becoming responsible (viz. trustworthy) rememberers.
3.1 The Sociality of Memory
A socially dependent account of memory suggests that memory is only possible 
through reference points within social relations, and that precise, localized 
and dated memories are only made possible in the context of a social memory 
(see Halbwachs, 1985). In trying to apply individual psychological mechanisms 
of remembering to the collective realm, Assmann (2009: 134) identifies two 
spheres or types of memory: Storage memory functions as knowledge that is 
sunk in the background and is currently not addressed. Functional memory,  
in the foreground, is “inhabited memory” that is acquired, group-based, selective, 
normative and future-oriented. The unstructured, unrelated elements of the 
storage memory enter the functional memory as composed, constructed and 
connected. As an example of “uninhabited memory”, thus storage memory, 
Assmann (Ibid.) considers historical sciences which she characterizes as “second 
grade” memory, the memory of memories, which incorporates whatever has 
lost its vital reference to the present. In order for stored or uninhabited memory 
to unfold its orienting strength, its elements have to be acquired, that is, chosen 
by importance, made accessible and be given a certain meaning. Functional 
memory is thus selective, which is why it always realizes only a part of possible 
memory content. According to Halbwachs, it is this conversion from neutral 
elements of memory into meaningful ones, whereby memory turns into 
collective memory (Assmann, 2009: 135, with reference to Halbwachs, 1985: 
138f.). However, what does not fit into a meaningful configuration or narrative 
is not forgotten: it remains within the storage memory and offers the back - 
ground for functional memory and further configurations, new connections and 
changes in conscious memory.21 
Collective agents such as states or nations constitute themselves through 
a functional memory, in that they pursue a specific narrative of the past. 
Among the different uses of functional memory are legitimation, delegitimation 
and distinction (Ibid: 138). Legitimation is the main concern of official or 
political memory. Legitimizing political memory has not only a retrospective, 
but also a prospective side: the rulers do not only want to appropriate the  
past as the origins of their rule, but want to be remembered, their deeds to be 
archived and memorialized. Such official memory is dependent on censorship 
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and artificial animation, for it only endures as long as the power that it supports 
endures. However, it also creates an unofficial counter-memory, which is a 
critically subversive functional memory. This leads us to the function of delegit-
imation: Such counter-memory, most obviously illustrated by the memory  
of those defeated, cannot be erased. In fact, the more the victors exclude or 
deliberately oppress and reject other voices, such as those of the defeated,  
of victims in general, oppressed minorities or women, the more their memory 
will be solidified. The symbol of the official memory will at the same time 
become the symbol of a counter-memory, and can be understood as the delegiti-
mization of power structures, which are experienced as oppressive. It is just  
as political as official memory, since both are concerned with the legitimacy 
(respectively, illegitimacy) of power. 
A further usage of cultural memory is distinction, i.e. symbolic expres-
sions that serve to profile a collective identity. Within secular, nationalist 
movements, it is the reconstruction or invention of shared traditions that creates 
identity for the nation as a new political agent. This may also create respon-
sibilities on behalf of citizens to remember their history and traditions. The 
establishment of a new national identity often comes with a selective view of 
its past that emphasizes and mythologizes one’s own victimhood and, at  
the same time, instances of victory. The aim of establishing a national identity 
through shared collective memory is to promote a sense of togetherness and  
to provide cues for identification for members of the group, eventually to 
ensure a kind of ‘internal stability’. Therefore, what is selected and maintained 
in the collective memory is reconstructed in a way so that members can 
sympathize with their membership and may consider the group as legitimate. 
However, what one official memory may do is to illegitimately exclude any 
opposed memory from the realm of accurate and reliable memory activity. It 
excludes the people holding up the counter-memory from the community of 
‘good rememberers’, rejecting them as unreliable, or simply unworthy of having 
a voice that counts. Certainly, a rejection of counter-memories can be either 
based on valid or bad (viz. illegitimate or unethical) reasons. Particularly 
because of the normative relevance of memory, e.g. the important role it plays 
in the transfer of valuable knowledge, in constituting identity and processing 
trauma in the aftermath of atrocities, one can also assume there to be norms 
and standards which one ought to adhere to when constructing memory. It 
ought to be possible to accept memory to be reconstructive or functional in the 
sense described above, while at the same time being epistemically successful 
in the sense that there are good reasons to remember particular things in a 
particular way in order to approach the truth.
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3.2 ‘Good Remembering’: 
Norms and Standards for Successful Memory
An important contribution to the discussion of the social dimension of memory, 
or remembering as a practice of identification and its relation to truth has  
been made by Sue Campbell, who especially investigates the ethical and social 
epistemological implications of certain memory practices. The “reconstruc-
tivist model” of memory, as she claims, “resulted in widespread scepticism 
concerning the reliability of memory and the suggestibility of rememberers” 
(Campbell, 2014: xv). Campbell draws her considerations from the context of 
the “false memory debates” during the 1980s and 1990s, where “thousands  
of women were thought to have mis-remembered or confabulated a history of 
child sexual abuse under the influence of their therapists – the view prevailed 
that the sociality of memory distorts and contaminates memories” (Ibid.).  
In maintaining that memory is inherently relational and thus inevitably influenced 
by others and ourselves, Campbell urges us to rather look at ways in which 
such influence may either facilitate ‘good remembering’ or distort memory, and 
points out that the sociality of memory is no contradiction to its status as  
true or accurate. For memory to be successful (rather than distorted) means to 
remember in ways that aim at truth and are guided by the virtues of accuracy 
and integrity. An accurate recollection involves the concern to recall the facts, 
but also “to get their significance right” (Ibid: xvii). This claim carries, thus, an 
inherently ethical dimension. With regard to the distinction between successful 
and distorted memory, the norm of integrity comes into play, which is
“a trait in virtue of which self-consciously fallible rememberers take a 
stand for their own account of the past, often in the face of compelling 
dominant narratives that circulate in communities with which they 
identify […] integrity is a needed component of our faithfulness to the 
past; but any concern with integrity is also a concern with selves and 
their identities.” (Ibid.)
As the idea of functional memory implies, whenever we speak of cultural 
memory, the process of memory creation serves a certain purpose. The fact 
that it may serve a political purpose does not per se discharge its truthfulness. 
There is nothing inherently unreliable or bad about political memory, for truth 
does not easily give way in identity projects. Rather, truth is crucial to our 
integrity and projects of self-constitution (Ibid: 66). We first have to acknowledge 
that ‘responsible rememberers’ care about truth, otherwise we cannot  
“credit particular individuals with caring about self-knowledge or integrity” 
(Ibid: 67). The case of the “false memory debates” particularly shows a failure 
of such credit, where women’s care about truth was categorically denied.  
Such a failure of due credibility presents “a kind of epistemic injustice: ‘the 
injustice of having […] significant area[s] of one’s own experience obscured 
from collective understanding’ and from self-understanding” (Campbell, 2014: 
68, with reference to Fricker, 2006: 100). Until we acknowledge the importance 
of truth in people’s projects of self-knowledge and self-constitution, we may in 
fact not be able to identify injustices in the realm of our memory practices, 
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where some groups are oppressed with regard to their credibility, or capacity of 
accurate memory. The moral risks of such epistemic injustice for oppressed 
groups include “the risk of developing narrative resources that oversimplify the 
past and compromise the integrity of self-constitution” (Ibid: 68). Unless  
we believe that those who are oppressed are trying to get at the truth of their 
experience, “we cannot even get a grip on this distinctive kind of injustice” 
(Ibid.). There are countless cases in which memory is challenged in political 
contexts, also challenges that constitute a morally harmless, even desirable 
epistemic enterprise. However, in the context of Armenian genocide denialism 
we can observe particularly disrespectful challenges to memory that are 
“meant to undermine the credibility of those who testify to historic harms and 
thus disenfranchise their voices from participation in the collective endeavour  
of giving meaning to the past” (Ibid: 167). Surely, memory may fail to be truthful. 
The crucial point made here is that it is an ethical responsibility to learn “to 
share memory in ways that are respectful, reflective, and appropriately 
challenging […] to distinguish respectful from disrespectful challenge, and that 
we make ourselves accountable for doing so” (Ibid.).
3.3 “The Armenian Question”: 
Disrespectful Challenges to Memory and 
Disrespecting Rememberers
In the context of the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide, there are various 
reasons for the exclusion of voices that support the recognition of the 
genocide, as well as different strategies of genocide denial. Recognition of the 
genocide would not only mean admitting guilt and accountability, but also 
admitting that Turkish society had lived under a lie since the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic. Kieser et al. (2015: 5) are convinced that the most 
important reason for Turkey’s inability to accept culpability for the Armenian 
genocide is “the centrality of the Armenian massacres for the formation of  
the Turkish nation-state”, where “any move toward acknowledging culpability 
will put the very foundations of the Turkish nation-state at risk and will lead  
to its steady demise”. But the Turkish state has meanwhile not only a reactive 
attitude towards claims for genocide recognition. Rather, it has become very 
proactive in denialism through the institutionalization and professionalization 
of denial. This is done, for example, through the support of scientific research 
that tries to trivialize and relativize the genocide by telling ‘the other side  
of the story’. Such works often lead to exculpating accounts of the atrocities. 
Another strategy is to divert attention from the remembrance of the Armenian 
genocide by creating other occasions for remembrance. For example, on the 
centennial of the Armenian genocide, the Gallipoli anniversary was moved from 
April 25 to April 24. In 2016, skywritings appeared above New York City on April 
21 with slogans like “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk”, a phrase 
coined by Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, as well as “101 years of 
geno-lie”, “Truth = Peace,” and “Fact check Armenia,” which refers to a 
website aimed at countering alleged “Armenian misinformation”. They also 
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engaged in a widespread ad campaign.22 Further, there was a rally to “urge 
reconciliation on 1915 events” taking place on April 24, 2016 in Washington, 
D.C., which was rather a denialist protest march covered up as a “peace  
and solidarity” march.23 In regard to the latter, it needs to be emphasized that 
urging reconciliation and peace in contexts of genocide denialism is a further 
tactic by denialists to undermine the integrity of the genocide victims and their 
descendants, since it implies that it is their fault that the conflict persists. 
So while there are various reasons why Turkey still refuses to take 
responsibility for the genocide, and while there are many strategies to proac-
tively deny the genocide, they usually consist in disrespectful challenges to 
memory, in the sense that Armenians are rejected from the community of ‘good 
rememberers’. The emphasis on truth, facts and reliability either renders 
Armenians incapable of ‘successful remembering,’ or as opportunistic and ill 
willed towards Turks by propagating what they themselves allegedly know is  
a lie. Consequently, prejudices have to be considered as well when it comes to 
the discourse around the Armenian genocide. However, what does the role of 
prejudice mean for historians and other researchers, and the archives they work 
with? The Armenian genocide is the second most researched genocide after 
the Holocaust, and there is not only a consensus among historians, but also 
among genocide scholars (including legal scholars) that the crimes can be 
qualified as genocide.24 These conditions leave one to wonder what we may do 
to counter such prejudiced perceptions about the credibility of ‘the other’. If 
Turkish organizations continuously shout the slogan “let history decide” and 
claim that the real facts have not yet been established, can archives eventually 
help to set the records straight? Can archives as well as historians working 
with them be considered as the impartial and objective resort from this never-
ending claim for facts and the truth? 
22 See http://armenianweekly.
com/2016/04/22/genocide-denial-ads/ 
(last accessed 20 December 2016).
23 The rally was organized by the Turkish 
American National Steering Committee, 
formed in March 2015. It was primarily 
advertised as a peace and solidarity walk 
for Turkey in its efforts to support Syrian 
refugees and for the achievement of 
security and stability in the Middle East. 
However, it has afterwards been misused 





(last accessed 20 December 2016).
24 Even Raphael Lemkin referred to it as a 
case of genocide as he understood the 
term. See panel discussion on CBS from 
February 13, 1949: https://vimeo.
com/125514772. See also the Interna-
tional Association of Genocide Scholars’  
(IAGS) Open Letter Concerning Historians  
Who Deny the Armenian Genocide,  
1 October 2006, as well as IAGS Armenian 
Genocide Resolution, unanimously 








en.mfa (last accessed 26 April 2016).
26 The political demand of such a historical 
commission is an illustrative example of 
the ignorance so pertinent in genocide 
denialism, for it ignores the many 
historians and other academic scholars 
that have already established ‘the facts’ 
as well as the normative framework 
supporting an assessment of genocide in 
an accurate way.
27 See http://www.zoryaninstitute.org/
collections.html. The Zoryan Institute 
undertook a major oral history program  
in 1983.
The problem with considering archives as the guardians of a kind of ‘objective 
truth’ about the past is that archival documents are also selected and interpreted 
according to their significance for a certain present purpose – either according 
to the institutional regulations or by the archivists working with the documents. 
To put information of archives into a narrative needs the active engagement  
of people who give meaning to the information provided by archives. However, 
reliance on human action does not just come about when the archives are 
used, but when they are created as well. While documentary evidence may help 
to verify, support or challenge testimonial evidence, to use it as evidence 
requires an assessment of authenticity and reliability with regard to the condi-
tions under which they were created and preserved. What, then, could set the 
records straight? Perhaps the establishment of a “joint historical commission” 
of Turkish, Armenian and international historians, as has continuously been 
proposed by Turkish president Erdogˇan?25 Who will decide upon the particular 
historians involved in this commission?26 And on the other hand, what are  
the criteria or rules that help in the assessment of archival records as authentic 
and reliable, so that they can be said to ‘represent the truth’? These issues 
need to be clarified in order to see what role archives play in the establishment 
of an accurate and shared assessment of the past.
Besides the state archives as the key source of information about the 
actions of the state, further important archival sources include archives of 
other governments, intergovernmental bodies, private sector institutions as 
well as papers of individuals (Peterson, 2010: 123). However, the problems 
involved in accessing the archives of other governments have not only to do 
with their physical or digital availability or the restricted access to documents, 
but also with language barriers (see Akçam and Dadrian, 2011: 4). Records of 
governments other than the country in which the violations happened are also 
relevant, such as the official archives of the allied powers France, Britain and 
Russia, the United States, as well as the Central Powers Germany and Austria-
Hungary as the main wartime allies of the Ottoman Empire. Since Armenia 
belonged to the Russian Empire following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
(with a short period of independence, the First Republic of Armenia, from 
1918–1920), it can be assumed that some historically relevant documents can 
be found in Russian state archives. Further potentially relevant sources are 
archives held by the Armenian Apostolic Church, the political and spiritual leader 
of Armenians within the Empire; archives containing repositories from the 
Dashnak Party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) as well as the First Republic 
of Armenia, located in Boston; the archives of the Armenian Patriarchate in 
Jerusalem; and the Catholicoscate in Etchmiadzin, Armenia. Another important 
source are the Zoryan Institute archives, where families of Armenian survivors 
deposited their private documents from the 1980s on.27 Such personal records 
have become more and more important not only for scientific research, but  
for dealing with the past in general. 
The previous lack of attention to testimonies of victims and survivors in 
historical research with regard to the Armenian genocide has, for example, 
been noted by Alexandra Garbarini. She has stressed that scholarly work, 
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especially the work of historians, has until a few decades ago too narrowly 
focused on official documents, leaving equally valuable testimonies of victims 
and survivors largely untouched. She illustrates the underlying problem of  
this phenomenon especially with the example of Bryce and Toynbee’s volume 
The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–1916, pointing to  
a problematic perception of victims as categorically unreliable testifiers:
“On the one hand, incorporating victim testimony in the composition  
of [this document volume] proved essential in order to inform, convince, 
and awaken sympathy among readers. On the other hand, the editors 
assumed that they would be unable to overcome their readers’ doubt and 
mistrust, their refusal even, to accept this type of source as valid and 
believable documentation.” (Garbarini, 2015: 150)
This was due to the perception that any Armenian source would lack  
the ‘neutrality’ necessary to serve as a reliable source in terms of representing 
the facts of what happened. As Garbarini (2015: 125) notes, 
“the fact that they had experienced violence directly did not qualify them 
to be the privileged communicators of their experiences. On the contrary, 
their personal experiences rendered their testimony suspect because it 
made them more likely to fabricate stories in order to advance their 
political, emotional, or financial interests.”
What can be observed here is a prejudice towards the victims, who are 
categorically rejected from the realm of reliable epistemic agents. Garbarini 
however points to the hypocrisy of such a belief that the addition of apparently 
‘neutral’ sources would compensate for the perceived lack of unreliability of 
victim testimony, since in their own eyewitness accounts, missionaries, doctors, 
nurses, teachers, and even consuls “detail their feelings of terror, sorrow, 
helplessness, and anger, including avowals of their disgust for Turks and for 
Muslims in general” (Ibid: 127). Apparently, the “suffering and emotional 
investments of so-called ‘neutral’ eyewitnesses […] had no bearing and only 
their political/national/ethnic/religious group belonging informed the writing 
and the reading of their testimonies” (Ibid.).
 Garbarini and Adjemian (2015: 18) note that is only since the beginning 
of the 1990s that historians “came to consider testimonies produced by 
victims and survivors of the massacres and deportations as sources worthy  
of serious scholarly interest.” It can be assumed that it was due to the 
persistent genocide denialism that historians have hesitated to base “histori-
cally objective analysis on sources that, by their provenance alone, appeared  
to be tainted by the subjectivity of the victims and the experiences they lived 
through” (Ibid.). This has eventually led to historians’ focusing on proving  
the intention of the perpetrators and the organized character of the killings, in 
order to eventually provide the legal elements for a qualification of the facts  
as genocide. But to focus mainly on official archives means to restrict analysis 
to the more general nature of the political-military circumstances and the 
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conduct of the genocide, while “[i]t is the study of victim testimony, ultimately, 
that has made an essential contribution to establishing concrete knowledge  
of the implementation of Turkish policies in specific localities” (Ibid.). To categori-
cally exclude victim testimony from the realm of reliable knowledge leads to  
a loss of valuable knowledge that would give more insights into the micro-level 
experience of the destruction of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. In this 
regard, it is fortunate that oral history has become an important tool for historical 
research nowadays. Certainly, the most reliable result can be achieved  
in combining, respectively comparing information from different sources. In 
criminal law this is also referred to as ‘corroboration’ of evidence emanating 
from numerous sources in order to support a proposition already supported  
by some initial evidence. In this case, to complement victim testimony with 
other sources renders a more thorough picture of past events. However, to qualify 
the credibility of the various sources by reference to the ‘neutrality’ of the 
record creator (or the testifier) poses not only an ethical, but also conceptual 
problem: this assumed juxtaposition between ‘neutral’ records versus victims’ 
testimonies, where the latter are judged as biased and unreliable from the  
out start, shall be further questioned in the next sections. It will be argued that 
archives as well as personal and collective memory do not grow naturally,  
but are the result of normatively structured social interaction – and in that 
sense never ‘neutral’. 
4.1 The Creation of Archives
 
The Assumed Neutrality of Storage Memory
 
While storage memory is considered as the main condition for change, Assmann 
also notes that storage memory is just as little naturally growing as functional 
memory. As with functional memory, the establishment of storage memory is 
dependent on being supported by institutions that store, conserve, index and 
circulate cultural knowledge. Archives, museums, libraries and memorials are 
part of this task, as well as research departments and universities (Assmann, 
2009: 140). Still, according to Assmann, these institutions are warranted relief 
from immediate social needs, so that they are able to resist the unwilling 
repelling of the past as well as its conscious dismissal through functional 
memory. A society which cannot afford such niches and “free spaces” cannot 
establish a storage memory (Ibid.). Therefore, the purpose or intent behind  
the creation of either storage or functional memory is the crucial criterion for a 
qualitative distinction between the two. In the domain of storage memory, or  
in the institutions that support it, distance is embodied, i.e. they are usually 
barred from an immediate instrumental reference to processes of identifi-
cation. Its purpose is first and foremost not to dictate a specific meaning, but 
to act as a source from which current meanings can be verified, supported  
or corrected. 
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In certain cases, perhaps, the request that the domain of storage memory 
should enjoy distance from societal needs might be normatively desirable. 
However, the postmodern turn has now long been acknowledged within archival 
science and the perception of archivists as passive or neutral keepers (or 
destroyers) of records has shifted to considering them as active participants in 
the creation, collection, preservation and choice of information provided by 
their archives (see Schwartz and Cook, 2002: 9ff.). Archives are no longer seen 
as neutral or impartial due to the active influence of archivists and the institu-
tional legislation in which they are embedded. Rather, records and archives are 
“dynamic technologies of rule which actually create the histories and social 
realities they ostensibly only describe” (Ibid: 7), where some events are excluded 
and others are not. Just as with individual or collective memory, archivists  
– or the institutional rules accompanying their work – select and interpret the 
records that are to become ‘the archive’. Archives, thus, are not only socially 
constructed institutions, but also have their own role in the production  
of knowledge about the past and “shape our notions of history, identity and 
memory” (Ibid: 8). So, what about the acclaimed objectivity, or ‘neutrality’  
of archives? As Schwartz and Cook point out, objectivity does not mean dis- 
engagement (Ibid: 9f.). To consider archives as social institutions in which 
existing power structures are entrenched is mainly to say that they cannot be 
considered as neutral agents, but have to be acknowledged as “major players  
in the business of identity politics” (Ibid: 16). As one of the main examples for 
this finding, Schwartz and Cook note the “gendered nature of the archival 
enterprise over time”, showing that “archives […] have been willing agents in 
the creation of patriarchy by supporting those in power against the marginalized” 
(Ibid.). However, one could question the claim that archives, respectively 
archivists have “willingly” suppressed e.g. women’s voices. After all, archivists 
primarily archive what they receive from dominant actors. Further, if we 
consider that archives simply mirror a society and its institutions, the voices of 
the marginalized will automatically be suppressed as well through documen-
tation or rather non-documentation.
But there is no need to be pessimistic about the non-neutrality of archival 
work. To engage in it with a dedication to societal aims can be crucial particu-
larly when it comes to the role of archives in dealing with the past. Here, 
archivists – as well as, of course, individuals and organizations documenting 
human rights violations – indeed have an important role in society and thus 
responsibility to consider its needs. Since archives that are considered important 
for dealing with the past help to address human rights issues after violent 
conflict, archivists may even become ‘activists’ in the sense that they ensure 
the preservation of records documenting human rights violations. In this 
regard, archives can be said to mainly have two roles within this process: they 
help in holding perpetrators accountable for their human rights violations,  
and they are relevant in preserving social memory and thus cultural heritage. 
To preserve, then, becomes an issue of preserving the “‘right stuff’ – materials 
that provide a tangible connection to the past, and memorialize and provide 
evidence of […] ancestors and of yesterday’s heroes and villains,” (Dirks, 2004: 
35f., with reference to Heald, 1995: 186) which is inevitably accompanied by  
a normative framework.
22
Setting the Records Straight
Partiality, Power and the Postmodern Turn
 
Putting a postmodern or critical approach at the heart of the archival endeavor 
is “not so much the relativizing of truth, but rather the multiplication of 
perspective” (Ketelaar, 2001: 132, with reference to van Sas, 2000: 172). A 
record does not tell everything per se, but “tells what the researcher wants the 
document to tell him or her,” meaning that “scholars (including archivists) are 
not, can never be, exterior to their objects” (Ibid: 139, with reference to Harris, 
2000: 96). Harris’ (2000) approach to archival research has been especially 
influenced by the experiences in South Africa, where large amounts of public 
records have been destroyed in the final years of Apartheid. One of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission’s mandates was even “to determine what 
articles have been destroyed by any person in order to conceal violations of 
human rights or acts associated with a political objective”.28 This provoked  
the general idea that archival appraisal, collection or, in turn, destruction are 
exertions of power, involving institutional processes that shape public 
archives. Considering this power to shape the archives and respectively, a 
crucial basis for accountability and memory, Harris (2002: 79) stresses that 
archivists should be held accountable for their appraisal decisions and 
endorse a high level of transparency. Archival practices depend on active 
decision making on the part of archivists, whereas at least in states governed 
by rule of law, such decisions are made within the framework of archives 
legislation and archival policies. But this means also that archival records do 
not necessarily reflect the “full reality” (Ibid: 83), as the positive paradigm 
would suggest – for they cannot be said to have recorded everything there is, 
but everything that was considered as important and meaningful.
Harris’ main concerns are the gaps within the documentation of the 
past, where the voices of the marginalized are usually left out. For subsequent 
memory processes, the gaps need to be filled by taking into consideration 
non-textual records as well. These include monuments, interviews, drawings 
and in the context of South Africa, “memory cloths” (Ibid: 86). Hence, print-
based media or written archival records should never be the only basis upon 
which authentic memory rests. Thus, to consider archives not only as basis for 
accountability, but also memory, means to rethink traditional notions of 
evidence and authenticity. This is also of crucial importance to the context of 
genocide denialism. In the case of the Armenian genocide, family archives 
– including photographs, letters and memoirs, but also inherited carpets and 
other furnishings – have become very important sources for memory 
production. For example, recent photo exhibitions throughout Turkey have 
aimed at emphasizing the presence of Armenians in Eastern Turkey before  
the genocide29, and victim or eyewitness accounts help to understand how the 
particular policies have been implemented in specific regions.30 Another 
important source are Turkish and Kurdish descendants who are increasingly 
interested in their own Armenian heritage, for example by becoming aware  
of having an Armenian grandfather or grandmother, and by remembering their 
stories of survival.31 
28 See Harris, “They Should Have Destroyed 
More”: The Destruction of Public Records 
by the South African State in the Final 
Years of Apartheid, 1990–1994, paper 
delivered at the conference The TRC: 
Commissioning the Past, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, June 11, 
1999.
29 Marsoobian has organized public 
exhibitions of his family archives, which 
contain many family photographs, 
memoirs and letters, throughout Turkey 
(and other countries). Some of the 
material is published in his book Frag - 
ments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering 
Armenia (2015).
30 For systematic collections with regard to 
the Armenian genocide, see e.g. archival 
collections held by the Zoryan Institute, 
the recently digitized Nubar Library 
available at http://www.bnulibrary.org/
index.php/fr/, the Armenian Oral History 
Archive at Columbia University or the 
Armenian Film Foundation’s testimony 
collection held by the USC Shoah 
Foundation.
31 This interest has especially risen since 
the publication of the book My Grand-
mother: A Memoir (türk. Anneannem) 
published in 2008, where Fethiye Çetin 
tells the story of her Armenian grand-
mother.
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What can be learned from postmodernist considerations with regard to 
‘archival objectivity’ is that “[t]he context behind the text, the power relation-
ships shaping the documentary heritage, and indeed the document’s structure, 
resident information system and narrative conventions are more important 
than the objective thing itself or its content” (Cook, 2001: 7). This is why the 
focus of analysis in archival work should be on “record-creating processes 
rather than on recorded products,” that is on the analysis of provenance, 
original order, arrangements and descriptions as well as appraisal (Ibid: 21f.). 
However, the fact that archives are up to the author’s determining of what is 
worthy to be documented, as well as up to the decisions of archivists in 
determining what is worthy to be archived, does not mean that the content of 
what is documented is unreliable, or may not be considered as legitimate 
evidence for a particular event that needs to be proven. In that sense archives 
are subjects of power relations, but they may still be brought about according  
to normative standards whereby the documents they contain can be considered 
as reliable evidence. This leads us to claim a “probative value” of archival 
documents (see e.g. Peterson, 2014). In this regard, what can then still  
be eva luated is the way in which the records were produced, which determines 
their reliability, authenticity, and eventually, their potential to serve as reliable  
or trustworthy evidence. When creating records, one can still adhere to virtues 
according to which they become more reliable, just as memory can be more  
or less reliable. Doing away with the notion of ‘neutrality’, we may just focus more 
transparently on the notion of reliability and authenticity of record, and the 
integrity of the record creator. Correspondingly, we may distinguish good from 
bad archival practices, as well as universal norms and principles according  
to which archivists should work. Therefore, whether we are dealing with the 
creation of documentary evidence or their use in creating a meaningful 
narrative, they are human creations and thus have the potential for conflict  
of interests: they are prone to be judged as biased or reflecting subjective 
beliefs. Archival documents always have to be contextualized, and thus can 
never lead to an ‘objective truth’ in the sense of a truth that exists beyond  
the realm of social reality. Still, archivists or appraisers should not per se be 
considered as a danger to the integrity of archives. The creation of archives 
would be meaningless unless it served a certain purpose. What postmodern 
thinkers shed light upon is that, just as in scientific research, where objectivity 
and truth are disputed concepts, it urges archivists to “reflect on the presump-
tions they bring to appraisal” (Eastwood, 2002: 62, with reference to Brothman, 
1991). Since the decisions and actions of archivists have political consequences, 
they cannot regard themselves as impartial or apolitical, but automatically 
carry responsibility towards society.32
32 It is therefore that a code of ethics also 
exists for archivists. See e.g. the ICA’s 
Code of Ethics, formally adopted on  
6 September 1996, currently available in 
24 different languages at http://www.ica.
org/en/ica-code-ethics (last accessed  
20 December 2016). For a list of further 
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4.2 The Use of Archives
New Concepts, New Interpretations
A crucial example for this flexibility of meaning of archival records is the fact 
that the creation of new concepts of injustices, especially within the relatively 
new fields of transitional justice, human rights documentation and dealing 
with the past, have also influenced the way in which we re-approach archival 
records. These concepts have especially helped in the discovery that public 
archives are subjected to power relations. They include records of dominant 
groups and their own experiences and interpretation of the context, while 
excluding marginalized groups and their experiences. However, we only become 
aware of these power relations once we have established new concepts or 
epistemic resources, thus being able to adopt a new lens through which one 
views the information contained in archival records. Consider, for example, the 
concepts of trauma, sexual harassment or genocide. These concepts were 
created out of the need to find specific terms in order to be able to identify and 
name specific experiences of wrongful treatment. The fact that they are 
created within a specific historical context does not mean that before this very 
concept was created, the experience to which they refer to did not exist before. 
The urge to find names especially for experiences of injustice or human rights 
violations stems from the fact that persons need to make their experiences  
of wrongful treatment intelligible to themselves and others, so that they can be 
dealt with properly in the aftermath. Scientific as well as moral progress leads 
to the creation of new concepts of injustice that can only be applied in retro-
spective to render a certain event intelligible. It can take a long time until such 
concepts are created and until people have the urge to apply them in retro-
spect. After traumatizing atrocities, it usually takes some time until victims (as 
well as perpetrators), survivors and their descendants try to remember and 
deal with their trauma (or guilt). Remembrance comes usually after a sense of 
individual and social safety and stability, as well as regaining of power and 
emotional control have been established (see Herman, 2015).33 All in all, I suggest 
that it is mainly our capacity of reason that makes the creation of such new 
concepts of justice respectively injustice possible, and they help victims  
of traumatic events to retrospectively reconstruct their trauma story. Were it 
not for the capacity of reason itself, without reducing it to mere relations of 
power, postmodern theorists would have difficulties to explain how sometimes 
people manage to break out of the power discourse in which they are. There 
would be no reason to consider ourselves as autonomous, rational and respon-
sible subjects if our thinking were only influenced by relations of power.
Objectivity, Partiality and Responsible Activism
Besides the important question of whether archival science or other sciences 
(especially historical science) can in any way ever be impartial or objective, it  
is not self-evident why this should be a desirable way to go. Justice sometimes 
demands from us to take sides, at least to a certain degree, while of course 
such side-taking must be reasoned for. Nevertheless, what seems to be 
important, above all, is not to mix up objectivity with neutrality or impartiality. 
33 Thanks to many human rights organiza-
tions, human rights violations are 
documented and securely archived, not 
only to serve for the potential creation  
of a counter-narrative, but more generally 
to claim justice in the aftermath of violent 
conflicts once the time is right.
25
Setting the Records Straight
To make this distinction means to acknowledge the potential role of archivists 
as activists, in the sense that they should use their power for the benefit of 
society (see Jimerson, 2007). Archivists “can address social issues without 
abandoning professional standards of fairness, honesty, detachment, and 
transparency” (Ibid: 273). Considering that knowledge is power, archival records 
can for example overcome efforts to deny the past (Ibid: 255). Objectivity thus 
does not mean neutrality in the sense of remaining neutral towards the needs 
of society. We may hold on to the concept of objectivity, but it needs to get rid 
of connotations to neutrality, selflessness, and passivity (Ibid: 271). Further, 
when it comes to the use of archival documents, “historians (and others) can be 
objective without forsaking engagement in discussions of values, politics, or 
social policy […] The demand is for detachment and fairness, not disengagement 
from life” (Ibid.). Also, to try to get to the truth of something does not mean to 
remain neutral and passive, but to “set intellectually responsible limits to it,” 
so that one cannot claim “the privilege of lying or obscuring the truth for good 
causes” (Haskell, 1998: 155). Intellectual and professional principles, including 
objectivity, respect for logical coherence, fidelity to evidence, honesty and the 
like “need not prevent us from addressing moral, ethical, or political issues” 
(Jimerson, 2007: 272). However, the view of the archivist as an ‘activist’ comes 
with further responsibilities. Both moral engagement and critical detachment 
are possible, if one uses the tool of “perspective” responsibly, for it is “only by 
means of these value-laden perspectives that the cultural world takes on 
meaning for us” (Haskell, 2004: 352).
Truth, Trustworthiness and Evidence
What is still missing from this discussion is the question whether there can be 
only one ‘true’ perspective on a past event: “To what extent can objective 
truths about the collective past or the rights and freedoms of individuals in a 
just society be sustained and justified within a historicist frame of reference?” 
(Toews 1999: 357). According to Toews, what binds ethical and political 
dimensions within an “intellectual community” together is trust. Individuals 
within the community must recognize each other as trustworthy – i.e.  
as indeed caring for the truth – if the institutions of mutual criticism and 
consensus building are to proceed without subjugation or rebellion, thus 
making the establishment of objective truth possible. The idea of recognizing 
others’ care for truth – and in that sense considering them as trustworthy 
– has been elaborated in the previous chapter.34 What is then the relationship 
between truth and evidence with regard to archival records? To speak of 
evidence always means evidence for something. Depending on the issue that 
needs to be proven, certain things may seem more relevant than others and 
thus serve as evidence for this particular issue. Thus, to consider a record as 
evidence is not to consider it as self-evident, in the sense of knowing the 
record’s meaning without having to spell it out. This would be “a narrow con - 
ceptualization [of evidence] that inextricably links the notion with legal  
rules, accountability and corporate memory” (Meehan, 2006: 127). Rather, the 
concept of evidence is very “specialized and specific to the disciplines that 
explicitly engage with and make use of it […]” (Ibid: 130). Records are evidence 
34 On the role of truth as an intellectual 
objective and a cultural value, see also 
e.g. Williams, 2002.
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for something, and they may as well be used as evidence for memory, not just 
legal accountability. The legal rules for documentary evidence have certainly 
been helpful for archivists in providing them with a language for the articu-
lation of standards for record trustworthiness (viz. reliability), since their key 
concern is also with the reliability, identity, and integrity of documentary 
evidence.35 According to Meehan, these are especially the rules of 
“auxiliary probative policy (which are one category of the rules of admis-
sibility) as they pertain to documentary evidence. These include: the 
rules governing reliability that are embedded in exceptions to the hearsay 
rule (particularly, the business records exception to the hearsay rule); 
the rules governing the authentication of documents; and the rule 
re quiring the production of originals (the best evidence rule).” (Meehan, 
2006: 132, with reference to MacNeil, 2000: 35–50)36
However, Meehan wants to suggest a broader understanding of evidence 
for archivists, which goes beyond the narrow rule-boundedness of the legal 
rules, by referring to Bentham’s account of the general nature of evidence and 
its role in how we construct knowledge of the real world. Bentham broadly 
defines evidence as “any matter of fact, the effect, tendency or design of 
which, when presented to the mind, is to produce a persuasion concerning the 
existence of some other matter of fact: a persuasion either affirmative or 
disaffirmative of its existence” (Ibid: 135, with reference to Bentham, 1827: 
17–18). To lose sight of this general nature of evidence and its applicability 
“leads to an impoverishment of the concept itself and skewed understanding 
of the nature of knowledge and reasoning in legal contexts” (Ibid: 136). The 
general understanding of the concept of evidence as “relation between a 
proposition to be proved and a proposition that proves” involves the study of 
relations between propositions, and the principles applied in this analytical 
process are not legal per se, but ordinary principles of inductive logic (Ibid: 137).
For an archival concept of evidence, we may therefore distinguish between 
two social acts: the making and keeping of records and the gathering and 
making of evidence. A record is, in the first instance, a physical object that can 
potentially serve as one part of a possible relationship with a past event, the 
tracing of which establishes matters of evidence. Neither containing evidence, 
nor facts per se, a record merely refers to events (or facts) outside itself. The 
process of arriving at an understanding of the events to which the record refers 
is one of inference: 
“A record is a meaningful communication, which means it consist of a 
physical object, plus an understanding, or representation of it. Some of what 
makes a record meaningful is inscribed within it, but often much of what 
makes it intelligible is not. Thus most of a record’s ‘recordness’ lies outside its 
physical borders within the context of its interpretation.” (Nesmith, 1999: 144) 
35 See e.g. MacNeil, 2000, as well as 
Peterson, 2014. 
36 The hearsay rule says that hearsay 
evidence, i.e. testimony or documents 
quoting people who are not present in 
court, is inadmissible because of the 
inability to establish their credibility, or  
to cross-examine the maker of the 
statement.
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Such interpretation is also “bound up with our ‘idea of the good’” and is 
therefore “connected to the wider intellectual and societal context in which it 
occurs” (Ibid: 142). An archivist helps in the creation or making sense of “the 
complex of internal and external relationships between records and events,” 
involving an analytical process of decision-making (Meehan, 2006: 144). 
However, evidence and memory are both important concepts, for “without 
reliable evidence set in context, to be sure memory becomes counterfeit,  
or at least is transformed into forgery, manipulation or imagination. Without 
the influence of and need for memory, evidence is useless and unused.”37 
We may recognize that work with archival records is largely a matter of 
active social engagement and interpretation, while at the same time acknowl-
edging standards and normative principles that should guide these activities. 
According to Peterson (2010: 128), “archival items must be subjected to the 
test of authenticity (they were created or sent by the person who seems to 
have created or sent them at the time shown), integrity (they are complete and 
unadulterated) and reliability (the information contained in them can be 
trusted as a full and accurate account of the transaction, action, or fact).” So 
for a record to be reliable, its “contents can be trusted as a full and accurate 
representation of the transactions, activities or facts to which they attest and 
can be depended upon in the course of subsequent transactions or activities” 
(Peterson, 2014: 3). With the notion of trust at the core of reliability38, the next 
chapter will focus on distorted perceptions of reliability due to prejudice 
towards particular knowledge claimants or sources of knowledge. It will 
illustrate how the previously discussed scientific and epistemic attributes are 
used or misused in political discourse in the context of genocide denialism. 
37 Terry Cook, Beyond the Screen: The 
Records Continuum and Archival Cultural 
Heritage, paper delivered at the Austral-
ian Society of Archivists Conference, 
Melbourne, 18 August 2000.
38 ‘Trust’ is often identified with reliability, 
although in philosophical debates, trust 
as mere reliability is only one form of 
trust. It is e.g. argued that trust in 
politicians, institutions or technology can 
and should be distinguished from trust  
in people with which we have personal 
relationships, such as friends, family 
members or romantic partners. For a 
debate overview, see https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/trust/.
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39 Smith et al, 1995, have revealed such a 
case of governmentally supported 
denialist research. See also Charny and 
Fromer, 1998, who also reflect on the 
thinking of academics questioning the 
reality of the Armenian genocide. For 
more recent essays on this topic, see 
Bayraktar, 2015, as well as Erbal, 2015. 
40 See e.g. Akçam, 2005
41 See also http://www.concernedhistorians.
org/content/ethichist.html for further 
codes of ethics for historians. 
Part of the professionalization of genocide denialism is its adaptation of scien-
tific methodology.39 However, there remains a difference between the 
phenomenon of denial and e.g. historical scholarship, as Karlsson contends: 
“While professional historical writing is concerned with evidence, source 
criticism, and impartiality, denial is rather concerned with provocation, deceiving, 
and giving the impression of objectivity and source criticism” (Karlsson, 
2011: 20). With sophisticated genocide deniers indeed having touched upon 
methodologies and appearances of professional historiography, their  
works have become dangerous tools to confuse the general public.40 This  
is especially because society tacitly acknowledges and authorizes academic 
scholars as experts and therefore as credible sources of knowledge: for the 
general public, appearing as a professional expert might suffice to trust in his 
or her words. By looking at it from an academic perspective, however, one can 
indeed distinguish reliable or responsible from bad or distorted scholarship. 
Whether we are dealing with the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, the 
Rwandan genocide, Srebrenica or any other genocide, the fact that so many 
sources have served as factual evidence for the assessment of the historical 
events as genocide has made it rather difficult for deniers to engage in sincere 
source criticism. Rather, the strategy involved by deniers are “distortions 
caused by the selective use or omission of crucial facts” (Karlsson, 2011: 30, 
with reference to Hovannisian, 1978: 381). Genocide deniers repeatedly call  
for others to engage in objective research and source criticism, while claiming 
that anyone supporting what deniers call the ‘genocide claim’ is engaging in 
the politicization of history and incapable of conducting research that is empiri-
cally grounded. By that, they neglect or misinterpret all evidence that had 
indeed been taken into account by these historians and genocide scholars.  
As Karlsson (2011: 37) mentions in the case of David Irving, a notorious 
Holocaust denier, he ignored or deliberately suppressed “material when it ran 
counter to his arguments. When he was unable to do this, he expressed 
implausible doubts about its reality.” The point made here is that deniers can 
be identified by not adhering to the professional responsibilities and objectives 
of a historian, in that they, among other things, willfully disregard, discard  
and mistreat evidence in order to render a deceitful picture of the historical truth. 
However, what are the duties and responsibilities of historians? De Baets 
(2009: 188ff.) has proposed such a code of ethics for historians, where he 
mentions for example in Article 10 that “[i]ntegrity is the moral foundation of 
the historians’ work. It shall be the intent of historians to honestly search  
for the historical truth, even if they are aware that their knowledge is provisional 
and fallible […]” and “[h]istorians shall always oppose the abuse of history  
(its use with intent to deceive) and the irresponsible use of history (either its 
deceptive or negligent use).” Further, with regard to historical methodology, 
Article 13 states that 
“[h]istorians shall adopt a critical attitude and use a method based on: 
(1) accuracy (transparency; respect for evidence and argumentation; 
control of bias and anachronism; impartiality and objectivity) at the levels 
of statements of fact and description, and (2) plausibility at the levels  
of statements of opinion and analysis.” (Ibid.)41
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In what follows, especially two patterns of denial shall be discussed which 
both deal with the mistreatment of evidence in scientific (particularly historical) 
research. These are (i) rationalization and trivialization, involving the denial  
of evidence, as well as (ii) self-image and self-delusion, involving self-confir-
mation and denigration of others. These two patterns are interconnected,  
in that the perception of self and other also influences one’s attitude towards 
evidence.
(i) Rationalization and Trivialization:
The rationalization of genocide considered here is not a professional attempt 
to explain genocide, but rather “point[s] towards argumentative strategies 
aimed at diminishing the extent, magnitude, and scale of […] the Armenian 
genocide” (Karlsson, 2011: 41). The arguments of the rationalization strategy 
place
“[e]mphasis […] away from the planned, systematic process of mass 
murder, and genocide is explained in the context of general wartime 
casualties, the number of victims are minimized, and doubt is cast upon 
the reliability of the eyewitness testimony and documents relating to 
mass killings.” (Hovannisian, 1999: 202)
While not denying that anything happened, rationalization goes as far  
as, for example, to maintain that “there is no/not enough valid evidence to 
conclude an event of genocide” (Karlsson, 2011: 41). Arguments of trivialization, 
on the other hand, claim that the number of victims is exaggerated (assuming 
that this would run counter the idea of an intent to destroy a group), that the 
presumed victims were mainly provocateurs and enemy collaborators, or that 
even though many people have died, there was no intent to destroy a group.  
In contrast to the ‘nothing happened’ kind of absolute denial, arguments of 
rationalization and trivialization can be seen to include “a much higher degree 
of historical detail,” (Ibid.) where archival material is discussed and put into a 
coherent narrative. 
A selective use of archival material, respectively willful disregard of 
evidence that runs counter one’s prejudiced or otherwise illegitimately 
motivated research agenda seems to be at the heart of denial as rationali-
zation and trivialization.42 It is not only the selective use of archival material, 
but at the same time the denial of particular evidence – such as evidence 
provided by bystanders, or the evidence provided through the Constantinople 
trials, as discussed in the first chapter of this paper. With regard to the 
Constantinople (i.e. Istanbul) trials, Justin McCarthy contended that “[t]he 
government […] held kangaroo courts in which officials and generals of  
the past government, usually tried in absentia and thus unrepresented, were 
convicted of crimes real and imagined” (Karlsson, 2011: 51, with reference  
to McCarthy, 2001: 129). The trials are generally dismissed as “show trials, 
conducted only in an effort to please the victorious powers of the war” 
(Karlsson, 2011: 51).43 However, even if they would have been “show trials”, 
42 “These forms of denial are intended to 
create doubts and cloak disinformation 
by appealing to a sense of fair play and  
of ‘lending an ear’ to the other side of a 
misunderstood and misrepresented 
issue.” (Auron, 2009: 55, with reference  
to Hovannisian, 1999)
43 If we recall the thorough study by Akçam 
and Dadrian (2011) discussed in the first 
chapter of this paper, it becomes obvious 
that McCarthy is ignoring the vast 
evidence provided by the many Ottoman 
daily newspapers of that time which 
demonstrate that the Ottoman society 
generally condemned the Armenian 
genocide, as well as other sources which 
show the sincere manner in which the 
Sultanate tried to follow-up on the Treaty 
of Sèvres and bring all known perpetra-
tors before a military tribunal.
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this would not disqualify the records as such. Put into context and compared 
with various other sources (e.g. documents on the atrocities themselves), the 
records established by the trials can be considered as reliable evidence for the 
crimes and the responsible perpetrators.
The insincerity through which denialist research is conducted becomes 
apparent especially if one realizes that the rejection of evidence is often bound 
up with prejudice or conspiratorial ideas about how the evidence was created. 
For example, Heath Lowry has considered the eyewitness reports and memoirs 
of Henry Morgenthau, American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 
1913–1916, and taken to be one of the most important witnesses of the Armenian 
genocide, as mere propaganda: “In order to disqualify the bystander memoir, 
and in effect the Armenian genocide as a whole, Lowry spotlights Morgenthau’s 
Armenian connections, maintains that the memoirs in fact were written by 
someone else, and determines that the sole purpose of writing the memoirs 
was a ‘short-term propaganda coup’” (Karlsson, 2011: 53, with reference to 
Lowry, 1990: 11, 14ff., 23 and 37).
Another strategy to shatter the reliability of records is the creation of 
conspiracy theories. Here, the Armenian genocide is considered as a myth that 
was created as allied war propaganda, as “Western attempts at raising public 
opinion against Turkey and Germany” (Karlsson, 2011: 59). While the latter  
is not a completely implausible interpretation, it does certainly not imply that 
what had been propagated was entirely made up (telling perhaps only a part  
of reality makes it nonetheless reality). However, as a very devoted denier of the 
Armenian genocide and acknowledged conspiracy theorist, Samuel Weems 
claims that the Armenians “played the Christian versus Muslim ethnic-card, and 
told stories about an imagined massacre to gain sympathy” (Karlsson 2011:  
59, with reference to Weems, 2002: 115). Weems suggested that what he calls 
the “myth” of the genocide aimed at getting Christian nations to support the 
Armenian revolutionary cause and give them financial aid. In this manner, 
Weems even claims that he “uncovered facts that prove Armenian- Americans 
are spreading tales claiming a massacre and genocide in an effort to get  
mega-dollars out of both the Turks and American Christians” (Karlsson, 2011: 
58, with reference to Weems, 2002: xi). This conspiratorial approach to 
genocide denial is also very well-known in the case of Holocaust denial, where 
Zionists are said to have been the orchestrators of the Holocaust “hoax”, with 
the supposedly murdered Jews spending “their time hiding either in Israel  
or the US, receiving and demanding huge reparation payments from Germany” 
(Ibid., with reference to App, 1973: 3f.). The humiliating nature of this kind  
of claim is evident, for it reduces the victim group to immoral, opportunistic 
and greedy people who use a horrible lie only to get money. 
(ii) Self-Images and Self-Delusion: 
Another key pattern of denial employed by genocide deniers is their “wish to 
portray themselves as objective seekers of truth” (Karlsson, 2011: 65). What is 
of primary concern to genocide deniers is not the truth itself, but the 
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appearance of truth, reliability and objectivity: “In order to create this 
appearance of truth and professionalism, deniers both tend to confirm their 
own excellence, and constantly point out the inadequacies of ‘traditional’ 
scholars” (Karlsson, 2011: 66).44 Concerning self-confirmation, the “common 
strategy is to portray yourself as fighting for truth against a rigid and corrupted 
establishment” (Ibid.). What seems as a noble scholarly aim, however, is a 
self-delusional and unprofessional way to turn themselves into “martyrs  
of history”. For example, Weems mentions in the preface of his book the various 
hate mails and threatening letters he and other fellow colleagues received, 
which prove to him that “he is ‘a teller of the truth’” (Karlsson, 2011: 67, with 
reference to Weems, 2002: xxiii). What makes this rather unprofessional is  
the way in which it goes along with a denigration of others – as has already 
been mentioned above. Welcome targets are, of course, Armenian scholars, 
such as for example Armenian-American historian Hovannisian, who is 
presented as one of many “Armenian spin-doctors” (Ibid: 68, with reference  
to Weems, 2002: xv). Those presenting the ‘traditional view’ are judged as 
pro-Armenian scholars who “tend to defend their positions from behind ‘blinders’ 
which allow them to see only what they want with no regard for the larger 
picture” (Ibid., with reference to Lowry, 1990: vi). The strategy of ‘projection’, 
namely accusing others of what they are accusing you of, is common among 
genocide denialists: No matter what arguments are brought forward in order  
to diminish the accuracy and integrity of what one side claims, the other side 
will use the same type of argument in return. For people not knowing much 
about the topic, or not being able to do their own research, this is enormously 
confusing and surely creates the impression that the genocide is still a 
debatable fact. 
Karlsson is certainly not the only scholar detecting such general patterns 
of denial of known genocides (or other mass atrocities), especially by comparing 
denial of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide. Important work in this 
regard has been done, to only name a few, by historian Hovannisian (1978; 1999), 
or Charny’s work on the psychology of denial (e.g. 1998; 2001, where he 
focuses especially on cases of pretended ‘innocence’ of denial).45 In general, 
literature on historical denial is prominent in the cases of the Holocaust as 
well as the Armenian genocide. However, these patterns of denial can be found 
in all cases of known genocides and other mass atrocities. In Denial: History 
Betrayed (2008), Taylor discusses four further case studies: the Japanese 
denial of war crimes; the British Communist Party’s denial of Stalinist oppression; 
denial of Serbian war crimes and genocide; and Australia’s denial of dispos-
session and massacre of the Aborigines.46 In the introduction of his book, he 
aptly summarizes some of the patterns of denial involving the mistreatment of 
evidence as follows: 
“Deniers […] adopt a common set of techniques, including falsely claiming 
scholarly or technical expertise; using straw-man reasoning (the attri-
buting of false assertions to others to distract argument); […] forcing  the 
counter-denier into arguing about an event of minor significance in  
a manner that steers the debate well away from the larger mass of 
44 Karlsson also quotes Holocaust deniers 
such as David Irving, who “indicates that 
he goes to the bottom of things, leaving 
beside all biases of subjectivism and 
political motivations.” (Karlsson, 2011: 66, 
with reference to Irving, 2001: vii-viii)
45 A list of selected bibliography on the 
denial of the Armenian genocide can be 
obtained at the homepage of the Zoryan 
Institute, see http://www.zoryaninstitute.
org/bibliographies.html.
46 Further case studies include the 
Rwandan genocide denial, the denial of 
the Guatemalan genocide as well as the 
German responsibility for colonial 
genocide against the Herero and Nama, 
see e.g. Brehl, 2007. Germany has 
meanwhile acknowledged the genocidal 
nature of the crimes. However, what this 
means with regard to reparation efforts is 
still up to negotiations, see http://www.
justiceinfo.net/en/component/k2/31554-
germany-set-to-atone-for-its-african-
genocide.html (last accessed 5 January 
2017).
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corroborated evidence; […] contradicting widely accepted evidence or 
deriding it as a product of a conspiracy, thus placing opponents in the 
position of proving a negative; accepting evidence as proven or corrobo-
rated even when there is neither valid proof nor corroboration; misrepre-
senting the views of opponents […] choosing to defy authorities or the 
law to gain publicity and martyrdom […].” (Taylor, 2008: xvi) 
To question the epistemic integrity of others is a common strategy, while 
it is often not based on reasonable argumentation, but either on prejudiced or 
politically, respectively ideologically motivated rejection of valid evidence. 
Those supporting the assessment of Ottoman atrocities against Armenians as 
genocide are considered as biased in their very nature: the Armenian genocide 
is considered as a political myth devoid of any empirical basis. Evidence  
is therefore rejected not because of reasonable argument and critique of the 
sources itself, but on the basis of distorted personal or political reasons  
and even conspiratorial ideas. For that matter, archival records kept in French, 
British or American archives may be perceived as biased or propaganda work. 
In a similar manner, every country that officially recognizes the Armenian 
genocide or has prepared parliamentary decisions to do so is considered as 
partial or even Turkophobic and/or Islamophobic (an assumption that suits 
well with the general claim of a Western conspiracy, although Turkish citizens 
who support genocide recognition are usually considered as traitors or “impure 
Turks”).47 The political claim that “it is impossible for Turks/Muslims to commit 
genocides”48 does not help in the creation of a healthy, critical stance toward 
one’s history and implies that only ‘others’ commit genocides. This is met by a 
double-standard policy of condemning and showing sincere upset for genocides 
of other peoples, such as the Holocaust or the Bosnian genocide49 – or, after 
Germany’s Armenian genocide resolution, the genocide in Namibia.50
Turkish history books continue to portray Armenians as the enemy and 
“a threat to national security,” they are “traitors and societal elements that 
murdered Turks and are easily incited.”51 This portrayal in itself can be seen as 
an incitement to further crimes, especially when other crucial facts of the past 
are denied. Even if the acts committed by Turkish security forces were initially 
interpreted as military actions against an ‘internal enemy’, research as well  
as witness testimony show that the policies and their implementation indeed 
pointed to an intent to destroy the Armenian ethnic group as such, and civilian 
casualties were not mere ‘collateral damages’ of legitimate military opera-
tions. Crucial drivers behind the conflict related to the Armenian genocide seem 
to be such historically transmitted stereotypes, and the only way to break  
this vicious cycle might be to foster a culture of openness to counter-evidence 
and alternative narratives. To remain immune to counter-evidence means  
to cling to a prejudice, an irrational and emotionally motivated upholding of a 
negative stereotype against the other. 
47 See e.g. Turkey’s press release regarding 
the Armenian genocide resolution passed 











accessed 18 April 2016).
49 See http://www.turkofamerica.com/
index.php?option=com_content&task=vi






(last accessed 20 December 2016).
51 See Akçam’s article in The Armenian 
Weekly, “Textbooks and the Armenian 
Genocide in Turkey: Heading towards 
2015” http://armenianweekly.
com/2014/12/04/textbooks/ (last 
accessed 18 April 2016).
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When assessing the value of archives in the context of Armenian genocide denial, 
we become aware of the challenges posed to the status even of reliable and 
authentic records, valid interpretations and the collective memory derived from 
it. Genocide denialism involves strategies of relativizing or trivializing 
evidence, their willful rejection or questioning the trustworthiness of their 
creators by reference to their social identity – or by claiming a general 
conspiracy. Besides creating public confusion, genocide denialism illegitimately 
rejects a particular social group from the community of trustworthy epistemic 
agents, thereby humiliating them anew. While the concepts of ‘objectivity’, 
‘neutrality’ and the like are scientifically disputed concepts, their political 
misuse in the context of genocide denialism makes denialist claims appear  
as scientific and guided by a dedication to the truth, while it is crucially 
distinct from responsible scientific research and actual respectful ways to 
challenge memory. These considerations do not imply that any historian 
questioning the authenticity of certain documents, or rejecting the reliability of 
certain victim testimony is a sign of politically and ideologically motivated 
distortion of the facts or an injustice done to the victim group. Rather, what  
I wanted to argue for is that there are certain strategies that engage directly in 
such undermining efforts, where ideology replaces logic. This includes, for 
example, dubious generalizations where the unreliability of one document is 
taken as proof not only for the unreliability of the document creator as such, 
but of an overall genocide lie fabricated by, e.g. Armenians or “the West”. 
Perhaps, then, a scientific approach to end genocide denialism is not reasonable, 
at least not primarily. Denial of genocides – not only in the case of the 
Armenian genocide – must be considered in terms of a political conflict rather 
than a scientifically unresolved debate about the past. 
However, reconciliation does fortunately not only rest with the govern-
ment. Neither does it only rest with academics and historians in particular 
– even though they indeed carry a special responsibility with regard to educa-
tional aims. It is also civil society initiatives which prove to be crucial for 
reconciliation mechanisms, since not everyone is able to access and process 
information provided by formal or public archives or academic work. In 
community-based remembrance and reconciliation versus more formal, macro-
level approaches, we may see a glimpse of hope where society can establish 
enough strength to influence the dominant political stance. A general increase 
in skepticism towards the government or even towards the idea of a “nation” 
may also foster interest and openness to question the official stance of  
the government towards its national history, thereby becoming receptive for 
counter- evidence.
The Hrant Dink Foundation is one of many important foundations within 
Turkey that aim at reconciliation of civil society, by supporting, among other 
things, “efforts to write histories devoid of nationalism and racism.”52 Memori-
alization and dialogue that aims at a shared meaning of the conflictual  
past may indeed help “to attenuate the development of identities based on 
victimhood and hatred of the other. Or identities based on guilt, which provide 
fertile ground for a culture of denial” (Bleeker, 2009: 13). This process rather 
52 See also the EU funded programme for 
“Support to the Armenia-Turkey Normali-
sation Process” which financially assists, 
empowers and engages civil societies of 
Turkey and Armenia to “contribute to the 
enhanced regional peace and stability, 
democratic pluralism and social inclusion 






aims at “social reconstruction” and “reclamation”, since it involves less 
emphasis on legal accountability and truth-telling, and more emphasis  
on promoting “economic, political, and social progress, as well as identity 
transformation” (Barsalou and Baxter, 2007: 5). In the context of Turkish 
denialism of the Armenian genocide, identity comes before truth, i.e. it is a 
particular perception about oneself and the other that distorts what one 
considers as ‘the truth’. The availability of archival heritage is therefore important 
in order to settle this controversy about the proper interpretation of the past, 
as well as a systematic political and institutional change in which there is a 
sincere commitment to democratic values and universal human rights. With 
regard to ‘identity transformation’, Turkey has to face and engage with its 
historical diversity and pluralism, rather than put all efforts into its neglection 
and suppression. 
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